The measurement of welfare change by Bossert, Walter & Dutta, Bhaskar
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/119594                       
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
The measurement of welfare change∗
Walter Bossert
Department of Economics and CIREQ, University of Montreal
walter.bossert@videotron.ca
Bhaskar Dutta
University of Warwick and Ashoka University
B.Dutta@warwick.ac.uk
This version: March 10, 2019
Abstract. We propose a class of measures of welfare change that are based on the gen-
eralized Gini social welfare functions. We analyze these measures in the context of a
second-order dominance property that is akin to generalized Lorenz dominance as intro-
duced by Shorrocks (1983) and Kakwani (1984). Because we consider welfare differences
rather than welfare levels, the requisite equivalence result involves affine welfare functions
only, as opposed to the entire class of strictly increasing and strictly S-concave welfare indi-
cators. Thus, our measures are associated with those members of the generalized-Gini class
that are strictly increasing and strictly S-concave. Moving from second-order dominance
to first-order dominance does not change this result significantly: for most intents and
purposes, the generalized Ginis remain the only strictly increasing and strictly S-concave
measures that are equivalent to this first-order dominance condition phrased in terms of
welfare change. Our final result provides a characterization of our measures of welfare
change in the spirit of Weymark’s (1981) original axiomatization of the generalized Gini
welfare functions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification No.: D31.
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1 Introduction
Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) have provided the basic framework within
which the modern approach to the measurement of inequality has developed. This approach
explicitly endows measures of inequality with a normative interpretation. This is done by
deriving inequality indices from social welfare functions defined on income distributions.
Each index so constructed inherits the distributional judgments embodied in the social
welfare function from which it is obtained. A reduction in inequality results in an increase
in social welfare provided mean income remains unchanged.
Since the underlying social welfare functions are supposed to be ordinal, the derived
measures of inequality are also ordinal. Hence, they can be used only to compare levels of
inequality associated with the income distributions of, say, two countries, or of the same
country at two points of time. However, it is also of considerable interest to ask questions
such as “Has country A been more successful than country B in reducing inequality over the
last decade?” A related but slightly different task is to compare the change in social welfare
in country A to that of country B during a given period of time. Since the two countries
may have a large difference in the rates of growth and since social welfare depends both
on the size and the distribution of the cake, it may, in fact, be more appropriate to focus
on comparisons of changes in social welfare. While this is the focus of this paper, we will
also discuss briefly how to address the issue of comparing changes in the level of inequality.
These are such natural questions that it is surprising that the existing literature has not
posed them. We conjecture that this may be the case because the ordinal framework of
Kolm, Atkinson and Sen does not accommodate comparisons of welfare changes.
A comparison of changes in levels of social welfare requires us to step out of the ordinal
framework since the ranking of differences of welfare is not preserved under ordinal trans-
formations of the welfare function. That is why we assume in this paper that the social
welfare function has cardinal significance. This allows us to define a measure, V , of the
change in social welfare between two income distributions, say x0 and x1. Furthermore, it
is meaningful to compare levels of V (x0, x1) and V (y0, y1).
Having defined this measure of welfare change V , we pursue two lines of inquiry. The
first of these constitutes our main contribution. The generalized Gini welfare functions
as introduced by Mehran (1976) and Weymark (1981) constitute the entire class of linear
functions of individual incomes that are increasing along the line of equality, anonymous
and weakly inequality averse. Although we restrict attention to a subclass of these functions
by imposing strict increasingness and strict S-concavity, we refer to our measures as the
generalized Ginis. Strict S-concavity (see Marshall and Olkin, 1979) is equivalent to the
conjunction of anonymity and the well-established strict transfer principle that can be
traced back to Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920). The strict Pigou-Dalton transfer principle
requires welfare (and hence equality) to go up when there is a transfer of income from
a richer person to someone who is poorer without reversing their relative ranks in the
distribution. Of course, the comparison of levels of welfare change can vary depending on
which member of the class of generalized Ginis is used. Since there are no firm ethical
reasons for preferring one generalized Gini function over another, it may not always be
possible to arrive at unambiguous comparisons. So, we ask the question whether it is
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possible to define a dominance condition which, if satisfied, guarantees that the comparison
of levels of welfare change give the same answer for all of the generalized Gini welfare
functions. This question has, of course, been asked in the context of income inequality.
Following Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970), Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973) proved
the most general such result by showing that if two distributions have the same mean
income, then the social welfare associated with income distribution x is higher than that of
y according to any strictly S-concave welfare function if and only if the Lorenz curve of x
lies everywhere above that of y. Thus, there is a precise dominance result for equality levels
that corresponds to the class of strictly S-concave welfare functions. Shorrocks (1983) and
Kakwani (1984) independently extended this result so as to be able to compare welfare
levels of income distributions which do not have the same mean incomes. They scaled up
the Lorenz curve of an income distribution by its mean income to obtain the generalized
Lorenz curve, and showed that generalized Lorenz dominance of income distribution x over
another distribution y also provides a necessary and sufficient condition for unambiguous
welfare comparisons. That is, x has higher social welfare than y for all strictly increasing
and strictly S-concave welfare functions if and only if its generalized Lorenz curve lies
everywhere above that of y.
We too use generalized Lorenz curves in our analysis of comparisons of welfare change,
but adapt them for our purpose. Consider any income distribution x for a population of
size n where individual incomes have been ranked in increasing order, so that xi ≤ xi+1 for
all i from 1 to n − 1. Then, the generalized Lorenz curve of x is obtained by plotting the
cumulative incomes of the lowest k income levels against k for all k from 1 to n. Suppose
now that there are two pairs of income distributions (x0, x1) and (y0, y1) (all of population
size n) indicating how income distributions have changed in countries A and B. Suppose
also that all individual incomes have been arranged in increasing order. Then, we compare
the sums of the cumulative differences between x0 and x1, and between y0 and y1. Put
differently, we focus not on the generalized Lorenz curves themselves, but on the sums of
the vertical differences between x0 and x1, and between y0 and y1. Our principal result is
that the welfare change between x0 and x1 is at least as large as that between y0 and y1
for all generalized Gini differences if and only if the curve corresponding to the cumulative
sums of differences between x0 and x1 lies everywhere above that of the corresponding curve
for the (y0, y1) distributions.
Of course, this dominance is equivalent to second-order dominance of the difference
between the x vectors and the y vectors. We then ask whether first-order dominance of the
difference between the (ranked) x vectors over the difference between the (ranked) y vectors
will imply unambiguous welfare change comparisons for a larger class of welfare functions.
Clearly, this class would then contain the generalized Gini welfare functions since first-
order dominance implies second-order dominance. However, we show the surprising result
that even when there is first-order dominance in this sense, there are numerous pairs of
distributions for which unambiguous welfare comparisons are possible only within the set of
linear measures of welfare change. So, once strict increasingness and strict S-concavity are
imposed, we are back to the generalized Ginis. Therefore, our result implies that first-order
dominance does not buy very much that second-order dominance does not already give us.
On the one hand, this demonstrates that unambiguous comparisons of welfare change are
2
very hard to make. At the same time, however, this observation can be used as a forceful
argument in favor of the generalized Gini welfare functions and their associated measures
of welfare change.
As a secondary task, we specify some appealing axioms or properties of V and charac-
terize the class of welfare change measures that are based on the generalized Gini welfare
functions. Our proof closely follows that of Weymark (1981), the principal difference being
that our axioms are imposed on the measure of welfare change rather than on the welfare
function. In addition, our axioms are also slightly different allowing for a shorter proof.
2 Measures of welfare change
Suppose that there are n ≥ 2 individuals in a society. A measure of welfare change is a
function V : R2n+ → R and we interpret V (x0, x1) as an indicator of the improvement (or
deterioration) associated with moving from last period’s income distribution x0 ∈ Rn+ to
the current distribution x1 ∈ Rn+. Our objective is to find a class of functions V that can
be expressed in terms of a difference in welfare levels. That is, we require V to possess the
following property.
Welfare difference compatibility. There exists a function W : Rn+ → R such that, for
all x0, x1 ∈ Rn+,
V (x0, x1) = W (x1)−W (x0). (1)
The fundamental objective of our contribution is to examine the possibility of measuring
differences in social welfare. Thus, welfare difference compatibility is an indispensable
axiom that lies at the center of our approach. It is based on the (normative) assumption
that an index of welfare change is well-defined.
We assume throughout that V satisfies a plausible monotonicity property.
Strict monotonicity. V is strictly increasing in x1.
It follows immediately that if V is strictly monotonic and a function W as in (1) exists, this
function W must be strictly increasing. Moreover, using (1) and the strict increasingness
of W , it follows that V is strictly decreasing in x0.
Anonymity requires that the individuals in a society be treated impartially, paying no
attention to their identities. The strict transfer principle is an essential equity requirement
that ensures welfare (and equality) to increase as a consequence of a rank-preserving pro-
gressive transfer. As is well-known, the conjunction of anonymity and the strict transfer
principle is equivalent to strict S-concavity. To introduce this property formally, we require
another definition. An n × n matrix D is doubly stochastic if its entries are non-negative
and all row sums and column sums are equal to one. We require V to be strictly S-concave
in its second argument.
Strict S-concavity in the second argument. For all x0, x1 ∈ Rn+ and for all doubly
stochastic n × n matrices D, V (x0, Dx1) ≥ V (x0, x1) and, if Dx1 is not a permutation of
x1, this inequality is strict.
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Clearly, if a function W as in (1) exists, it must be strictly S-concave if V is strictly
S-concave in its second argument. Moreover, the conjunction of welfare difference com-
patibility and the strict S-concavity of V in its second argument implies that V is strictly
S-convex in its first argument (strict S-convexity is obtained if the inequality in the defini-
tion of strict S-concavity is reversed).
The set of bottom-first-ordered permutations of the elements of Rn+ is given by
B = {x ∈ Rn+ | x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn}.
Let
A = {α ∈ Rn++ | α1 > . . . > αn}.
A welfare function W is a generalized Gini welfare function if there exists a parameter
vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ A and a number δ ∈ R such that, for all x ∈ Rn+,
W (x) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜i + δ (2)
where x˜ ∈ B is a bottom-first-ordered permutation of x. Thus, the weights αi are assigned
to the positions in an income distribution, where higher incomes receive lower weights in
order to ensure that the resulting welfare function respects the strict transfer principle.
Because we focus on welfare differences in this paper, the above formulation differs slightly
from Weymark’s (1981); he does not include an additive constant in his definition of the
generalized Ginis. Clearly, this modification does not affect any of the welfare comparisons
carried out by means of W . The corresponding generalized Gini measure of welfare change
is given by
V (x0, x1) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜
1
i −
n∑
i=1
αix˜
0
i (3)
for all (x0, x1) ∈ R2n+ . The measure of welfare change associated with the parameter vector
α ∈ A is denoted by Vα. The class of all generalized Gini measures of welfare change is
given by
VG = {Vα | α ∈ A}.
Because we restrict attention to anonymous measures of welfare and welfare change, it
involves no loss of generality to assume that x is bottom-first ordered.
3 Dominance properties
To simplify notation, we define
∆xi = x
1
i − x0i and ∆yi = y1i − y0i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
for all bottom-first-ordered income distributions x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B. The following dom-
inance property is a welfare-change adaptation of the generalized Lorenz criterion; see
Shorrocks (1983).
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Second-order dominance. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B, (x0, x1) second-order dominates
(y0, y1) if and only if
k∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Our objective is to derive a condition on any two pairs of distributions (x0, x1) and (y0, y1)
that will enable us to state that the welfare change between (x0, x1) is greater or smaller
than the welfare change between (y0, y1) for all measures of welfare change in the class VG.
So, we want to rule out cases where there are two parameter vectors α, α′ ∈ A such that
Vα(x
0, x1) ≥ Vα(y0, y1) and Vα′(x0, x1) < Vα′(y0, y1).
The following lemma provides a condition that prevents such reversals.
Lemma 1. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B,
V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG
if and only if
k∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . n} and for all α ∈ A. (4)
Proof. Sufficiency of (4) follows from the definition of the elements of VG.
To prove necessity, let Vα(x
0, x1) ≥ Vα(y0, y1) for some α ∈ A. Therefore, by definition
n∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0.
Suppose there exists a k < n such that
k∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) < 0.
Let c > 1 and define a vector αc ∈ A as follows. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
αci =
{
αi if i ≤ k,
1
c
αi if i > k.
Clearly, αc ∈ A for all c > 1, and there exists c∗ sufficiently large such that
n∑
i=1
αc
∗
i (∆xi −∆yi) < 0,
that is, Vαc∗ (y
0, y1) > Vαc∗ (x
0, x1). This shows that if (4) is not satisfied, then there are
two measures of welfare change in VG which differ in their ranking of the pairs (x0, x1) and
(y0, y1), a contradiction that completes the proof.
We prove one more lemma before stating the equivalence result regarding second-order
dominance.
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Lemma 2. Let x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B and suppose that (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Then, for all α ∈ A and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
k∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ αk
k∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi).
Proof. Clearly, the claim is true for k = 1. By way of induction, suppose that it is true
for all k′ < k. Then it follows that
αk(∆xk −∆yk) +
k−1∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ αk(∆xk −∆yk) + αk−1
k−1∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi).
Hence,
k∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ αk
k∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi)
since αk−1 > αk because α ∈ A and
∑k−1
i=1 (∆xi − ∆yi) ≥ 0 because (x0, x1) second-order
dominates (y0, y1).
The following theorem is our main result.
Theorem 1. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B,
V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG
if and only if (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Proof. Suppose first that (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1). Then, by definition,
k∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5)
Take any α ∈ A. Then the inequality
α1(∆x1 −∆y1) ≥ 0
follows from setting k = 1 in (5) and the fact that α1 > 0. Suppose that, for some
K ∈ {2, . . . , n},
k∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}.
We want to show that
K∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0.
6
By (5) and Lemma 2,
K∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ αK
k∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0.
Since α ∈ A was chosen arbitrarily, this inequality together with Lemma 1 establishes that
V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG.
Now suppose that V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ VG. We need to show that (x0, x1)
second-order dominates (y0, y1). In view of Lemma 1, it is sufficient to prove that if (4) is
satisfied, then (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Pick any α ∈ A. Then,
k∑
i=1
αi(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Clearly, ∆x1 ≥ ∆y1 since α1 > 0. Let K ∈ {2, . . . , n} and assume that
k∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}.
Suppose that
K∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi) < 0.
Multiplying by αK > 0, we obtain
K∑
i=1
αK(∆xi −∆yi) < 0. (6)
Let ε ∈ R++ and define αε ∈ A as follows. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
αεi =
{
αK + (K − i)ε if i < K,
αi if i ≥ K.
From (4), we know that
K∑
i=1
αεi (∆xi −∆yi) ≥ 0 for all ε ∈ R++.
But (6) implies
lim
ε→0
K∑
i=1
αεi (∆xi −∆yi) = αK
K∑
i=1
(∆xi −∆yi) < 0,
a contradiction to (4) that completes the proof of the theorem.
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A comparison with the result obtained by Shorrocks (1983) illustrates the impact of con-
sidering welfare differences rather than welfare levels. Because of the linearity inherent in
difference comparisons, not all strictly increasing and strictly S-concave welfare functions
have to agree in order to obtain an equivalence result but only those among them that are
affine—that is, those corresponding to the generalized Ginis.
Thus, as established in the above theorem, welfare functions other than the generalized
Ginis cannot be employed in an equivalence result that involves our second-order dominance
condition. This raises the question of whether a more stringent dominance definition can
accommodate a more general class of functions. For instance, we may want to impose a
first-order dominance property for welfare differences, defined as follows. Again, we assume
that, without loss of generality, the income distributions x0, x1, y0, y1 are in B, and ∆xi
and ∆yi are defined as above.
First-order dominance. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B, (x0, x1) first-order dominates (y0, y1)
if and only if
∆xi −∆yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Because first-order dominance implies second-order dominance, the generalized Gini mea-
sures of welfare change are compatible with this dominance property. There may be addi-
tional measures that can be accommodated in the first-order case but, as illustrated below,
all of them must be based on linear measures as well.
Let F be a class of measures of welfare change. If the members of F are to be compatible
with the first-order dominance criterion, it must be the case that if (x0, x1) first-order
dominates (y0, y1), then
V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1) for all V ∈ F
or, in terms of the underlying welfare functions W ,
W (x1)−W (x0) ≥ W (y1)−W (y0). (7)
Consider x1, y0 ∈ B and let x0 = y1 = (x1 + y0)/2, that is, the distributions x0 and y1 are
both equal to the arithmetic mean of x1 and y0. Therefore, by definition,
∆xi −∆yi = (x1i − x0i )− (y1i − y0i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Because x0 = y1 = (x1 + y0)/2, (7) requires that
W (x1)−W (x0) = W (y1)−W (y0) ⇔ W (x1)−W (x0) = W (x0)−W (y0)
⇔ 2W (x0) = W (x1) +W (y0)
⇔ W
(
1
2
x1 +
1
2
y0
)
=
1
2
W (x1) +
1
2
W (y0),
a condition that, along with strict increasingness, requires W to be a strictly increasing
affine function within the bottom-first-ordered subspace of Rn+. This, in turn, means that
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the associated measure of welfare change is linear. Because the only increasing functions
with that property other than the generalized Ginis are such that the parameter vectors α
do not respect the inequalities that define membership in A, it follows that these additional
functions fail to satisfy strict S-concavity. Thus, for numerous pairs of income distribu-
tions, even this first-order dominance condition does not allow for measures other than the
generalized Ginis if this fundamental equity property is to be retained.
We conclude this section with an observation that follows from Theorem 1. Consider the
question of making similar unambiguous comparisons of changes in the level of inequality,
where the measure of inequality is derived from a social welfare function according to the
approach by Kolm, Atkinson and Sen alluded to in the introduction. Take two pairs of
income distributions (x0, x1) and (y0, y1) each with the same (positive) mean income. Let
Z(x0, x1) = I(x1)− I(x0)
be a measure of inequality change, analogous to V . Suppose, moreover, that
I(x) = 1− xe
µ(x)
,
where µ(x) is mean income and xe is the equally-distributed-equivalent income correspond-
ing to the income distribution x and the welfare function W . That is, xe is implicitly
defined by
W (xe, . . . , xe) = W (x).
The index I has an intuitive normative interpretation: it measures the percentage shortfall
of the equally-distributed-equivalent income from average income, where this shortfall is
attributable to the presence of inequality in the income distribution under consideration.
Let IG be the class of inequality measures that are derived from the class of generalized
Gini welfare functions, and let ZG be the set of measures of inequality change that represent
the difference of inequality levels where the inequality index is some member of IG. In view
of Theorem 1, the following result is immediate.
Theorem 2. For all x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ B with the same mean income,
Z(x0, x1) ≤ Z(y0, y1) for all Z ∈ ZG
if and only if (x0, x1) second-order dominates (y0, y1).
Note that since we restrict the four distributions to have the same mean income, we
could also state the above theorem in terms of second-order dominance of the vertical
differences in the Lorenz curves.
4 Related literature
In a seminal paper on the measurement of tax progressivity, Kakwani (1977) proposes the
following measure P of tax progressivity
P =
1− t
t
(G−G∗)
9
where G and G∗ are the Gini coefficients of before and after-tax income distribution and t is
the average tax rate. Kakwani’s approach differs from ours because he focuses on a specific
measure of inequality and, therefore, there is no counterpart to the dominance approach
which forms the centerpiece of our contribution. However, there is a commonality since
differences in the aggregate (inequality versus social welfare) are compared.
Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) also discuss the measurement of change in inequality
as measured by the single-parameter Ginis. They use the difference in the levels of the
inequality measures in the two periods as their index of inequality change. Thus, their
approach is (implicitly) based on an assumption that parallels welfare difference compati-
bility. Letting Gs denote a single-parameter Gini, the measure of inequality change is given
by Gs(x
1) − Gs(x0), just as our measure of welfare change is W (x1) −W (x0). Thus, our
fundamental assumption is mirrored in earlier work. Beyond this commonality, however,
our contribution and that of Jenkins and Van Kerm diverge: they treat the requisite class
of measures as given and examine the decomposition of inequality change, whereas we al-
low our measures to be general at the beginning and narrow down the class by imposing a
dominance requirement.
Growth incidence curves have been used by various authors (such as Ravallion and Chen,
2003, and Son, 2004) to measure the effect of growth on the distribution of incomes. A
cumulative growth incidence curve shows the difference between the initial income of those
individuals who start out among the p poorest and the income of the p poorest individuals
in the terminal distribution. Since an individual may not be occupying the same rank in
the initial and terminal distributions of income, this implies that our paper as well as some
of the literature on growth incidence curves impose a ‘double anonymity’ condition (a label
suggested by a referee) because the identities of the individuals do not matter in either
the initial or terminal distributions. As we do, Ravallion and Chen (2003) and Son (2004)
discuss first-order dominance and second-order dominance of one growth incidence curve
over another. In that setting, second-order dominance means that the cumulative growth
incidence curve of the first distribution is everywhere above that of the second.
However, dominance comparisons that involve growth incidence curves do not shed
much light on the comparison of welfare differences across different growth paths. The
following example illustrates this observation.
Let n = 3 and consider the distributions x0 = (5, 10, 20) and x1 = (10, 15, 25). The
associated cumulative growth incidence curve is given by (1, 2
3
, 3
7
). Now consider the dis-
tributions y0 = (2, 5, 8) and y1 = (4, 8, 10) with the cumulative growth incidence curve
(1, 5
7
, 7
15
). It follows that the growth incidence curve for y second-order dominates that for
x. If welfare is given by the generalized Gini with parameters (3, 2, 1), we obtain
W (x1)−W (x0) = 30 and W (y1)−W (y0) = 14.
Clearly, dominance in terms of growth incidence curves may not translate into welfare
difference dominance when the initial distributions of income are not identical.
Bourguignon (2011) also proposes a new dominance criteria in the context of growth
incidence curves. A crucial difference between his approach and ours is that he considers
non-anonymous growth incidence curves by allowing changes in the ranks of individu-
als to matter. Clearly, keeping track of rank changes can be very important in many
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circumstances—Bourguignon himself mentions the measurement of income mobility. For
the question we pose, however, it appears to be natural to assume our version of S-concavity
(and hence anonymity). This is because we focus on measuring (aggregate) welfare change
as opposed to obtaining a measure that aggregates individual income differences. More
precisely, our starting point is a pair of income distributions x0 (the incomes in the pre-
vious period) and x1 (the distribution in the current period). We then ask the following
question: what can we conclude regarding the properties of a measure of welfare change V
that can be expressed as the difference between the welfare in the current period W (x1)
and the welfare in the previous period W (x0)? It is natural to assume that any period’s
welfare function is anonymous—surely social welfare cannot depend on who gets what in-
come. Once anonymity is imposed on the welfare function in one period, double anonymity
is an inevitable consequence.
Cape´au and Ooghe (2007) study an extended notion of generalized Lorenz dominance
by introducing a non-negative parameter r. For any two distributions x, y ∈ B, they define
r-extended generalized Lorenz dominance of x over y by the criterion
k∑
i=1
(1 + r)k−i(xi − yi) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
They then establish an equivalence result involving a subclass of the generalized Ginis that
is parameterized using the same value r as in the dominance criterion. Thus, Cape´au and
Ooghe (2006) also link (a subclass of) the generalized Ginis to a notion of generalized
Lorenz dominance but they do so in terms of levels rather than differences.
5 A characterization
We conclude this paper by providing a characterization of the generalized Gini measures of
welfare change. There clearly is a strong resemblance to Weymark’s (1981) axiomatization
but some arguments in his proof can be simplified here because our list of axioms is slightly
different from his.
In addition to welfare difference compatibility, strict monotonicity and strict S-concavity
in the second argument, we use the following two properties that are well-established in the
context of welfare functions. They continue to have strong intuitive appeal when formulated
for a measure of welfare change.
Positive linear homogeneity is a standard requirement for welfare functions that can be
expressed analogously as a property of a measure of welfare change.
Positive linear homogeneity. For all x0, x1 ∈ Rn+ and for all λ ∈ R++,
V (λx0, λx1) = λV (x0, x1).
Our final axiom is an independence condition that is restricted to income distributions
in which all incomes are ranked from lowest to highest. Recall that B is the set of bottom-
first-ordered permutations of the elements of Rn+. The welfare function analogue of following
property appears in Weymark (1981, p. 418).
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Weak independence of income source. For all x0, x1, y0, y1, z ∈ B,
V (x0 + z, x1 + z) ≥ V (y0 + z, y1 + z) ⇔ V (x0, x1) ≥ V (y0, y1). (8)
This axiom implies that W has the corresponding property as defined in Weymark (1981).
Using (1), it follows that (8) is equivalent to
W (x1 + z)−W (x0 + z) ≥ W (y1 + z)−W (y0 + z) ⇔ W (x1)−W (x0) ≥ W (y1)−W (y0)
for all x0, x1, y0, y1, z ∈ B. Setting x0 = y0, this simplifies to
W (x1 + z) ≥ W (y1 + z) ⇔ W (x1) ≥ W (y1)
for all x1, y1, z ∈ B, which is Weymark’s (1981) condition.
We can now state the result of this section.
Theorem 3. A measure of welfare change V satisfies welfare difference compatibility, strict
monotonicity, strict S-concavity in the second argument, positive linear homogeneity and
weak independence of income source if and only if V is a generalized Gini measure of welfare
change with a corresponding generalized Gini welfare function W .
Proof. That the generalized Gini measures of welfare change satisfy the axioms of the
theorem statement is straightforward to verify.
Conversely, suppose that V is a measure of welfare change satisfying the axioms. By
anonymity (which follows from strict S-concavity in the second argument), it is sufficient
to show that (2) and (3) are true for bottom-first-ordered permutations of the requisite
income distributions. As mentioned in the text, the welfare function W (which exists as a
consequence of welfare difference compatibility) inherits the properties of strict increasing-
ness, strict S-concavity and weak independence of income source suitably formulated for
welfare functions.
We now show that the restriction of W to bottom-first-ordered permutations must be
an increasing transformation of a strictly increasing linear function. Because we assume
that V satisfies positive linear homogeneity, the argument used in the proof of Weymark’s
(1981) Theorem 3 can be simplified. To do so, we first prove that the restriction of any
level set of W to B is a convex set. Let z, z′ ∈ B be in the same level set of W so that
W (z) = W (z′). Using (1) and the positive linear homogeneity of V , it follows that
W (z) = W (z′) ⇔ V (z, z′) = 0 ⇔ V (λz, λz′) = 0 ⇔ W (λz) = W (λz′)
for all λ ∈ R++. Letting θ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that
W (z) = W (z′) ⇔ W ((1− θ)z) = W ((1− θ)z′). (9)
Adding θz to both (1− θ)z and (1− θ)z′, weak independence of income source implies that
W ((1− θ)z) = W ((1− θ)z′) ⇔ W (θz + (1− θ)z) = W (z) = W (θz + (1− θ)z′)
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and, combined with (9), we obtain
W (z) = W (z′) ⇔ W (z) = W (θz + (1− θ)z′)
for all z, z′ ∈ B in the same level set of W and for all θ ∈ (0, 1), which implies that the
requisite level set is convex. Because W is strictly increasing, it follows that the restriction
of W to B is an increasing transformation of a strictly increasing linear function. Thus,
there exist β1, . . . , βn ∈ R++ and an increasing function φ : R+ → R such that, for all
x ∈ B,
W (x) = φ
(
n∑
i=1
βixi
)
. (10)
By strict S-concavity and because the elements of B are bottom-first-ordered, it follows
that β1 > . . . > βn. By anonymity,
W (x) = φ
(
n∑
i=1
βix˜i
)
for all x ∈ Rn+.
Using (10) and noting that, for any p, q ∈ R+, two distributions x and y can be chosen
so that
∑n
i=1 βix˜
0
i = p and
∑n
i=1 βix˜
1
i = q, positive linear homogeneity requires that
φ(λq)− φ(λp) = λ(φ(q)− φ(p)) (11)
for all p, q ∈ R+ and for all λ ∈ R++. Setting p > 0, q = 0 and λ = 1/p in (11), it follows
that
φ(0)− φ(1) = (φ(0)− φ(p))/p
and, solving for φ(p), we obtain
φ(p) = (φ(1)− φ(0))p+ φ(0) = γp+ δ
where γ = φ(1) − φ(0) is positive because φ is increasing and δ = φ(0) is a real number.
Therefore, φ is an increasing affine function and, setting αi = γβi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it
follows that α1 > . . . > αn and
W (x) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜i + δ
for all x ∈ Rn+. Using welfare difference compatibility, we obtain
V (x0, x1) =
n∑
i=1
αix˜
1
i −
n∑
i=1
αix˜
0
i
for all (x0, x1) ∈ R2n+ .
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6 Concluding remarks
The dominance properties employed in this paper are quite forceful because they apply to
income differences and, therefore, lead to criteria that are linear or affine within the set
of bottom-first-ordered distributions. The notion of dominance that we employ appears
to be a natural companion to our (normative) axiom of welfare difference compatibility
which lies at the center of our approach. We note that ours is not the only possible way
of assessing the changes associated with moving from yesterday’s income distribution to
today’s. In our setting, a welfare function is applied to each of the two distributions and,
thus, we focus on differences in welfare. An alternative is to examine welfare change based
on differences in individual incomes. In such a framework, an indicator of change could
be expressed as a function of the income differences (x11 − x01, . . . , x1n − x0n) instead of our
formulation that is based on the welfare difference W (x1) −W (x0). Our objective in this
paper is to examine the welfare-difference approach but the alternative just alluded to is
certainly worth exploring as well.
A related question is whether there may be dominance concepts that lead to additively
separable welfare functions of the form W (x) =
∑n
i=1 U(xi) for all x ∈ Rn+ with a strictly
increasing and strictly concave function U : R+ → R. This is an interesting issue but
unlikely to be answered in the context of the measurement of welfare change. Our notion of
second-order dominance is not suitable because it results in criteria that are linear within
the bottom-first-ordered subspace of Rn+ but not additively separable. Analogously, the
traditional property of generalized Lorenz dominance is too weak because it permits any
strictly increasing and strictly S-concave welfare function. Defining a dominance property
that corresponds to additive separability is a task that is by no means obvious to us but
constitutes a useful proposal beyond the scope of the welfare-difference approach analyzed
here.
In order to establish a dominance criterion that allows for welfare changes to be com-
pared across societies with different population sizes, one possible approach consists of
replicating the requisite societies and employing the dominance criterion that corresponds
to the larger population. Specifically, if we have pairs of distributions (x0, x1) ∈ R2n+ and
(y0, y1) ∈ R2m+ where n 6= m, we can consider an m-fold replication of (x0, x1) and an
n-fold replication of (y0, y1) and apply the dominance criterion for population size nm
to the replicated distributions. Of course, implicit in such a procedure—which is also
suggested by Shorrocks (1983)—is some suitable notion of a principle of population, en-
suring that such replications do not distort welfare-change-relevant features of the original
distributions. This observation leads us to the single-parameter Ginis, which are char-
acterized by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) by means of the principle of population.
A similar variable-population result that employs a recursivity property characterizes the
single-sequence Ginis; see Bossert (1990). In analogy to our characterization that parallels
Weymark’s (1981) axiomatization, these variable-population extensions can be adjusted to
our setting so as to apply to measures of welfare change.
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